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Three little children with doves on their shoulders 
Their eyes rolled back in ecstasy cryin’  
Please old man stop this misery 
They’re countin’ out the devil 
With two fingers on their hands 
Beggin’ the Lord don’t let the third one land 
On World War Three 
On World War Three 
Captain Beefheart, Dachau Blues 
1. Introductory Remarks 
By victim we mean one who has been harmed (or even killed) by another. In 
other words, a victim is a person or thing that suffers harm (or even death) 
from another person or some adverse circumstance or circumstances. 
First at all, in our paper we present simple models of meta-ethical 
relations connecting the central concept of responsibility with three types of 
personalities, love, hate and indifference. Likewise, we introduce the triangle 
of reconcilabilities based on the former triangle of personalities and the 
hexagon of reconcilabilities related to love, hate and indifference.  
So, let us recall the standard approach from A Theory of Justice by John 
Rawls. Instead of defining the meaning of the word liberty, Rawls poses some 
questions. The following assumption is introduced:  
(#) any liberty can be explained by reference to three items (in 
other words, complete explanations of liberty provide the 
relevant information about these three things): 
1. the agents who are free; 
2. the restrictions or limitations which they are free from; 
3. what it is that they are free to do or not to do (Rawls 
1999, 177) 
It is worth to emphasize that when Martha Nussbaum asks the question: 
(##) What are capabilities?, 
she writes down: 
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They are answers to the question, “What is the person able to do 
and to be?” (Nussbaum, 2011, 20) 
In consequence, we are more interested in questions concerning the meaning 
of the term victim rather than its definition. These are preparatory questions 
to a theory of victims. 
Our central question is:  
(?) Does contemporary (or postmodern) culture provide the 
means to understanding the perspective of victims?  
But this question is merely being posed here. At the end of our paper some 
preliminary answer is sketched. The Kindly Ones by Jonathan Littell is our 
starting point. To be exact – the question posed by Max Aue at Auschwitz:  
So I came to think: Wasn’t the camp itself, with all the rigidity of 
its organization, its absurd violence, its meticulous hierarchy, just 
a metaphor, a reductio ad absurdum of everyday life (Littell 2009, 
622).i 
We’d like to examine Reyes Mate’s works and explore the victim’s perspective 
together with him. 
2. Injustice and History 
According to Reyes Mate, violence is constant and not at all an accidental 
component of modern history. However, it is common to speak about victims 
both in the context of political violence and natural catastrophes, such as 
earthquakes or floods.  
Reyes Mate points out a very important distinction between what we 
call injustice (human violence/violence caused by humans) and inequality 
(caused by natural causes). He proposes a revision of basic notions and 
introduces fundamental oppositions. Inequality is considered natural, timeless 
(intemporal) and morally neutral, while injustice is historical, temporal, and 
entails faults and responsibility. Only through a reflection on injustices which 
takes memory into account can we consider a new theory of justice in which 
figures like the witness or the victim play key roles (Mate 2011, 10-11). 
Following Reyes Mate, the theory of the victim takes precedence in the 
methodological order of any reflection on justice. Injustice is the philosophical 
starting point for a possible theory of justice.  He provides an introduction to 
the philosophical/meta-ethical theory of victim (Mate 2002, 290-291). 
According to the author of Memoria de Auschwitz, the victim is always 
innocent, i.e. the executioner is guilty of injustice, and, more importantly, he 
will not ever lose this quality, even if he pays for his actions. Moreover, it is 
obviously inacceptable to confuse the victim with the sufferer, as happens 
                                                             
i For the detailed analysis of Littell’s question see Les niewski (2014, 19-23, 96-102) 
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when one talks abstractly about violence as “the violence, all violence, 
wherever it comes from”. Neither is suffering an attribute of the victim, nor is 
the victim the same as a defeated person. Reyes Mate points out that many 
Nazi executioners were eventually defeated, and that this suffering obviously 
never makes victims or innocents of them (Mate 2003, 195-200).  
Victims have their own voice, and we cannot allow anyone to 
substitute it or, obviously, forget it. This voice is telling us about the 
complimentary violence, which cannot be explain, nor justified: it is evil for 
evil. Reyes Mate claims that the executioner excludes himself from the human 
condition and delegitimizes his cause, and puts himself in what Primo Levi 
calls the “grey zone” of man’s inhumanity to man. The violence of the 20th 
century taught us that we are not born human, we became human. Within the 
“grey zone”, the level of humanity is below zero and the executioner cannot 
exit by himself. His fate is connected with the victim, and the possible re-
humanization of the persecutor depends on his awareness of the innocence of 
the victim and his own responsibility (Mate 2002, 290). 
Victims are often anonymous and silent, which is why Reyes Mate 
proposes a new politics (based on the presence and authority of the victim and 
their suffering) by means of the metaphor “mirada de la ví ctima” (sight of the 
victim). The victim’s perspective is the inverse of reality. It is something that 
cannot be rationalized nor substituted; like pain, it is always individual and 
incomparable. The existence and perspective of the victim complicates 
political analysis, since an element that forces us to revise and question our 
sense of security is introduced. Victims are not only a problem that needs to be 
solved. They constitute a stage which must be passed in every solution. They 
are the key to the possible integration of the violent part in a future reconciled 
political community. Following Reyes Mate, the moral authority of a victim 
derives from this fact. A victim knows that there is no peace at the end of 
violence. The sight of the victim forces us to revise the political approaches of 
those who condemn violence because the victims have an inverted vision of 
reality. What for others is evident, logical and right is not so for the victims. All 
that for others is accidental, secondary and contingent is normal for the 
victims. In this context, Reyes Mate quotes Walter Benjamin, who said that for 
the oppressed the state of exception is the norm, while for the powerful, 
people are only an exception. The executioner never understands, for he does 
not feel the hurt and despair he causes. Even if he also suffers, he does not feel 
the full contempt, injustice and pain (Mate 2011, 210-218). 
3. Victims. Three Models of Personality and Responsibility 
Let us introduce three model personalities: 
(1) a saint, a person who is responsible for every one (a person full of 
compassion); 
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(2) a psychopath, a person who is responsible for no one (a person full 
of cruelty);   
(3) an elitist, a person who is responsible for at least one person, at 
least for oneself.  
We try to sketch some logic of these concepts, i.e. meaning rules of 
them, by means of standard diagram (Figure 1) – a triangle of mutually 
exclusive  models of  these (idealized) personalities.ii 
 
   
 
Figure 1. Triangle of personalities 
 
Speaking more technically, four standard relations (between extensions)  are 
taken into consideration (Tab. 1). 
 
relation traditional name graphic representation 
contradiction contradictio 
 
contrary contrarietas  
subcontrary subcontrarietas  
subaltern subalternatio  
Table 1. Logical oppositions 
 
In a very natural way we arrive at the relevant hexagon of model personalities 
(Figure 2). 
                                                             
ii The continuous bold line represents the relation of being mutually exclusive (the 
relation of mutual exclusiveness). 
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Figure 2. Hexagon of personalities 
 
There is also – perhaps more – fundamental connection between the model of 
the saint and the famous Dostoyevsky’s formula (from The Brothers 
Karamazov): 
(D) Each is guilty for all. 
By means of propositional function (“x is guilty for y”, G(x, y) in symbols) and 
two standard general quantifiers we put the following sentence: 
(D) xy G(x, y). 
Let us exchange the propositional function “x is guilty for y” for the function “x 
is responsible for y”. Hence the following triangle of opposition is achieved 
(Figure 3). We would like to call it “Dostoyevsky’s” triangle. 
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Figure 3. Triangle of responsibilities (“Dostoyevsky’s” triangle) 
 
As long as the classical logic (of the first order) provides the basis of our 
research the next octagon (of logical oppositions) shall be introduced 
(Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Octagon of “Dostoyevsky’s” oppositions 
 
4. Discourse of Reconciliation 
Concerning the types of discourse about victims, Reyes Mate distinguishes 
two: 
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a) the discourse of peace, and  
b) the discourse of reconciliation.  
They may seem similar, but these are two different types of discourse. Peace is 
associated with the law – democratic peace, for instance, is when all citizens 
are subject to the laws they established. Inevitable differences and conflicts 
are resolved by procedures and expressed in these laws. Violence is precisely 
an imposition or unilateral rejection of the norm, or a violent “solution” to a 
conflict, i.e. the negation of the law. Peace is achieved when the rule of law 
prevails. On the contrary, reconciliation is coexistence in a community.iii 
Emphasis is placed not on politics or the law, but on the divided society, 
broken by internal conflicts. Following Reyes Mate’s thoughts on the process of 
reconciliation, we need more than just the law, since the law does not help 
fight ancient hatreds or divisions that escape ration analysis. The law stops 
when, for instance, a murderer is convicted and punished; however, 
reconciliation requires an admission of guilt and the forgiveness of the victim 
(of society). Reyes Mate emphasizes that political interests focus on peace and 
avoid reconciliation, as if this was not the competence of politics. Usually, the 
only aim of politics in the case of violent conflicts or terrorist attacks is to stop 
killing. By this approach, we proclaim the absolute value of life, but not of 
every life – only our own life. This is our message to persecutors, terrorists 
etc., who we do not want to kill us. The state is interested in guaranteeing the 
life of the living, and this difference is essential one. If we really considered the 
absolute value of life, we could not so easily move on with the killed ones, nor 
use so effortlessly the notion of forgiveness and oblivion. Only the victims can 
forgive, and that is why amnesties entail confusion, because the state cannot 
substitute the voice of the victims. The victim’s role is crucial in the process of 
reconciliation (Mate 2011, 208, 232-233; Mate 2011a, 44-46). 
It is worth pointing out that Christie introduced the famous matrix 
(Table 2) (Christie 2006, 5). 
 
 EPISODIC VIOLENCE STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 
direct violence indirect violence 
VIOLENCE 
 
1. Typically kills or 
harms people 
quickly 
2. Intermittently kills 
or harms people 
3. Acute insult to well-
being 
4. Dramatic 
1. Typically kills or 
harms people slowly 
2. Continuously 
deprives people of 
basic needs 
3. Chronic insult to 
well-being 
4. Normalized 
 
 
                                                             
iii For the difference between forgiveness and reconciliation, see Freedman (1998). 
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PEACEBUILDING 1. Reduces violent 
episodes 
2. Emphasizes 
nonviolence 
3. Seeks to prevent 
violent episodes 
4. Produces 
intergroup tension 
reduction 
5. Uses intergroup 
contact and 
dialogue 
6. Supports the status 
quo 
1. Reduces structural 
violence 
2. Emphasizes social 
justice 
3. Seeks to ameliorate 
structural violence 
4. Produces intergroup 
tension 
enhancement 
5. Uses intergroup 
contact and 
noncooperation 
6. Challenges the status 
quo 
Table 2. 
 
We will proceed “graphically” by means of a trichotomy – namely, a triangle of 
opposition between three concepts. To begin with three definitions are 
introduced. We say that to love someone is to desire that person’s good and to 
take effective steps to secure it.iv Consequently, to hate someone is to desire 
that person’s detriment and to take effective steps to achieve it. Finally, to be 
indifferent (to someone) means neither to love (that person) nor to hate (that 
person). It is assumed that these three concepts are mutually exclusive. So 
they form the so-called the triangle of oppositions (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. 
 
Just for the sake of simplicity, a reconcilability is understood here as the 
capability of becoming friendly after antagonization. Consequently, relevant 
concept of irreconcilability is obtained in the following way. By irreconcilability 
we mean merely the incapability of becoming friendly after estrangement.   
                                                             
iv See for example, Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate [Charity in Truth], Introduction, 7. 
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Suppose that there are two different persons that love each other (i.e. 
one loves the other and vice versa). Hence one may say that there is a direct 
correlation between love and irreconcilability: lovers are impossible to 
reconcile. It is assumed also that only the mutual concern for the welfare of the 
another person results in quarrels and fights among lovers. Of course, falling-
outs and even dustups do not affect their reciprocal friendship. 
Let us recall at this point that hatred is understood as follows: to hate 
someone is to desire that person’s detriment (i.e. damage, loss, harm) and to 
take effective steps to achieve it. Imagine now two different persons that hate 
each other (i.e. one hates the other and vice versa). It is assumed that hatred is 
harmful and/or at least (very) unhealthy. This supposition is not widely 
recognized as obvious, since one has to remind for example that there is no 
honor in honor killing. Nevertheless, our assumption leads to conviction that 
haters must be cured of their disease, illness or affliction, i.e. mutual concern 
for disadvantages and losses of the another person. Haters are necessary to 
reconcile, since friendship is a normal state of health and kindness is a 
symptom of wellness. Therefore counterreconcilability calls for help and  direct 
correlation between hate and counterreconcilability seems to be evident. The 
following diagram is received (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6. Triangle of reconcilabilities 
 
Next step in our analysis consists of very natural extension this triangle into a 
relevant hexagon (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Hexagon of reconcilabilities 
5. Memory and Victims 
After this preparatory part we refer to Reyes Mate’s approach in order to focus 
on the role of memory in the theory of justice and in order to enable us to 
construct a theory of historical responsibility, of the place of past injustices in 
the present, and of the political significance of historical memory. Mate points 
out that a theory of justice starts with reflection on injustice. 
Memory is important and, in fact, plays a crucial role in the theory of 
justice; however, this role is dialogical. Reyes Mate considers that “Memory is 
justice” (Memoria es justicia) because without memory, there is no justice. In 
Memoria de Auschwitz, he points out that despite the political failure of 
Nazism, its amnesic program proved to be a success. The Nazis tried to destroy 
their victims not only physically, but also by acting as if they never existed. We 
should consider the total destruction of memory as the highest form of 
barbarism. Therefore, justice can also be considered the memory of injustice 
because memory opens inquiries that science has closed (if no proof exists, we 
must stop the investigation).  
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When we mentioned the dialogical character of Mate’s approach, we 
meant the specific perspective of the victim. The famous formula “no more 
war” or the imperative that we must remember (study, commemorate) war 
atrocities, crimes and genocides means worrying about the future; but, in fact, 
we are worrying about ourselves, not about the victims. Following Reyes Mate, 
real justice should be built by and for the victims. Therefore, without memory, 
universal justice is not possible. Another very important aspect of this 
approach is the fact that there are two levels of reflection, and the most 
important one is never connected with the law. Even peace is presented as an 
artificial and purely juridical concept that does not reflect reality. What is 
important in reconciliation is the process in which people who were in conflict 
start to live together again without violence. Hence, memory is only the 
beginning of a process that ends in reconciliation.   
Without memory, there is no injustice, but there is also no justice. This 
causes a serious problem because without the memory of all the injustices, it 
is impossible to construct a theory of justice, as such a theory implies 
generality. However, it is obvious that there are definitely many forgotten 
injustices, and remembering all the injustices exceeds human capacities; this 
would be rather be the prerogative of a divine mind. How, then, can we think of 
justice, when we only have a human mind? “This is the question of 
philosophy”, since human beings cannot dispense with justice. 
According to Reyes Mate, there are also many remembered injustices, 
but the question remains – how to do them justice? We should focus on the 
received hurts and attempt to tell their stories/narrate them. Obviously, there 
are hurts which can be satisfied and others that are beyond repair. Those 
which are possible to repair should be compensated for by the part of the 
population who remembers them. This is the aim, in one way or another, of all 
the laws of historical memory, which seek to amend materially or formally 
persecuted groups/groups of victims.  
However, what can be done when injustice is irreparable: do we move 
on? close the chapter?, relegate it oblivion? These are the most popular 
solutions. But there is another possible answer: to commemorate what is 
beyond repair. Recognize a debt to the past and mourn the suffering, on which 
our prosperity is built. 
Reyes Mate admits that this is a modest form of justice, but at the same 
time it is a fundamental one. If we reject it, we admit that the justice is 
defined/measured by the executioners according to their possibilities for 
rendering compensation or by the penalties that they may impose, and not 
according to the hurt received by the victims. That is why the memory of 
injustice is so important, because even when it does not entail the material 
satisfaction of the hurt, it recognizes the right of victims to request/demand 
justice. 
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6. Remarks on Injustice 
Reyes Mate emphasizes on many occasions that a true theory of justice should 
not seek “the essence” or “the true meaning” of justice, but must study and try 
hard to repair injustices.  
He formulates another alternative: justice or atrocity (O Justicia o 
barbarie). Justice is the heart of every culture and civilization (as opposed to 
barbarism), and constitutes the most important virtue, since every other 
virtue helps us to be perfect, that is, we cultivate them for our own good, while 
justice is the only one that is focused on the good of the Other.v  
Following Reyes Mate, Auschwitz was not the first such case of 
inhumanity, nor was it the last we will meet. It is, however, an extreme episode 
in the history of Western rationality. It was not madness, nor a moment of 
insanity in history; it was – according to Mate, as well as Rosenzweig, Buber, 
Foucault, and Agamben – the result of a process that involved the best of 
occidental civilization. Therefore, we must ask the question if the values we 
have defended were not contaminated forever? We should rethink the ideas of 
political, moral and esthetic coexistence, and of responsibility from the point 
of view of the victims. The Holocaust forces us to reflect upon the presence of 
barbarism in the construction of humanity.  
According to Reyes Mate, a new central category of philosophical 
reflection – memory – does not consist in commemorating the past, but in 
recognizing that our present is built on corpses and debris, on the victims of 
history, and that they are part of our landscape.  
Is Auschwitz a nightmare for the survivor or is it the only reality, while 
everything else is just an illusion? In one sense, this question is compatible 
with Henryk Elzenberg’s view that Auschwitz was not an aberration, but a 
vanguard event. Reyes Mate also asks: Is the concentration camp a marginal 
place or is it our natural “habitat”? This question evokes the works of Foucault 
and Agamben, but we would like here to mention the Polish writer and – as 
Reyes Mate says – philosopher, Tadeusz Borowski. Borowski was an Auschwitz 
survivor who wrote a short story in the form of letter entitled “Auschwitz, Our 
Home”. The experience of the concentration camp gave Borowski a new, 
absolutely reverse opinion on Antiquity, an epoch he used to admire and 
consider enlightened, if not the epitome of human culture. (Les niewski 2014, 
21-24). After the War, he wrote that he could no longer admire ancient  
 
                                                             
v Of course, Reyes Mate points out that this is a tradition that dates back to Artistotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
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monuments because he now knew how many innocent people died as slaves 
during their construction. He despised Antiquity because it was a time of 
slavery.vi Reyes Mate twice quotes his famous formula:  
(B) There can be no beauty if it is paid for by human injustice, nor 
truth that passes over injustice in silence, nor moral virtue that 
condones it (Borowski 1976, 128, cf. Mate 2011, 41). 
Borowski held the point of view that Reyes Mate tries to introduce in his 
reflection on justice, a perspective that changes everything, that does not allow 
us to ignore the barbarism present in our civilization from the very beginning. 
Quite paradoxically, Littell also seems to have the same perspective, since Max 
Aue is presented as a well-educated, sensible, elegant young man, who did not 
even want to be a soldier and would have preferred not to be involved in the 
war. He has fine tastes and could be considered a “highly civilized” man.  
How is our own reconciliation possible? How can each of us come to 
terms with ourselves, when we find out what bestiality humans are capable of, 
and when culture, following Littell, no longer protects us from bestiality. 
7. One General Remark: A New Paradigm in Humanities? 
Concerning the debates on justice, Reyes Mate always refers to what he calls 
the intellectual gesture of Bartolome  de las Casas. During his famous 
discussion with Sepu lveda, he rejects the principle of impartiality (or 
neutrality) for solidarity – in this case, solidarity with the victims. For Las 
Casas, neutrality is morally reprehensible when we know the situation of the 
victim, or when we know the motives of the executioners as he did. He knew 
the conquistadors’ motives – the desire to acquire gold and other riches; 
therefore, the conceptual shift is not between barbarians and civilization, but 
between the center (power) and the periphery (colonies), where the victim is 
usually located. Las Casas wanted to know the reality of the victims. Moreover, 
as Reyes Mate postulates, he gave voice to the authority of a testimony. Las 
Casas not only knew about injustices, but he saw them, as well. It is interesting 
that Las Casas had the opportunity and access to two perspectives: central (of 
the persecutors) and peripheral (of the victims) (Mate 2011, 254-258).  Rosillo 
Martí nez draws attention to the similarities between the testimony of Las 
Casas and some of the natives of New Spain, which proves that he could 
                                                             
vi “You know how much I used to like Plato. Today I realize he lied. For the things of 
this world are not a reflection of the ideal, but a product of human sweat, blood and 
hard labour. It is we who built the pyramids, hewed the marble for the temples and the 
rocks for the imperial roads, we who pulled the oars in the galleys and dragged 
wooden ploughs, while they wrote dialogues and dramas, rationalized their intrigues 
by appeals in the name of the Fatherland, made wars over boundaries and 
democracies. We were filthy and died real deaths. They were ‘aesthetic’ and carried on 
subtle debates” (Borowski 1976, 98-142). 
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write/see/know from the perspective of the victim. (Rosillo Martí nez 2012, 
73-75) Therefore, he decided to make a radical gesture: to send Aristotle for a 
walk “mandar a Aristo teles a paseo” (Las Casas 1975, 3) 
Reyes Mate point out this methodological order. There is no theory of 
justice on margins of injustice, one cannot understand humanity on margins of 
the experience of inhumanity, there are no human rights on margins of 
everyday inhumanity. There is no truth nor goodness if not as an answer to 
falsity and horror (Mate 2002, 299; Mate 2011, 41).  
Does contemporary culture allows us to reconcile with the victim’s 
perspective: we have to find the way to this reconciliation, otherwise, the 
weight of the testimonies of the victims will crush us – crush our conscience, 
our memory is filled with images of victims from the past! We postulate – 
following Reyes, Littell and Borowski – new paradigm in humanities for a new 
culture (Les niewski 2014).  
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Abstract. The aim of our paper is twofold. Firstly, very original approach to 
the question of victims elaborated very thoroughly by Reyes Mate is presented. 
Unfortunately, his conceptualization of victimology is relatively little known 
outside Spanish and Latin American culture. It is meant as a basis for adequate 
theory of injustice and justice. Secondly, comprehensive and detailed meta-
ethical analyses of fundamental concepts used by Reyes Mate are developed 
here by means of standard methods, i.e. triangle, hexagon, and octagon of 
logical oppositions. 
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